Introduction.
G. Gentzen introduced the notion of sequent, which consists of the antecedent and of the succedent, each of which in turn is a sequence of finite formulas, and utilizing that notion he formulated the formal system L K for the classical logic. Then by restricting sequents to ones whose succedents are sequences of at most one formula, he obtained from L K the formal system L f for the intuitionistic logic. Later, Takahashi in [3] , and Rousseau in [1] independently, extended the notion of sequent to that of matrix, which consists of the 1st row, the 2nd row, • • • , and of the N7 th row, each of which in turn is a sequence of finite formulas, where Al is a natural number greater than 1, and then utilizing that notion they formulated the formal system M L K for each M -valued logic.
What is obtained from the system M-LK, when we restrict matrices to ones whose M th rows or more rows are sequences of at most one formula? This paper is one answer to this problem.
Let U be a subset of the non-empty finite set T of truth-values. We take a formal system for a many-valued logic having T as the set of truth-values, and then restrict every inference rule by which a connective is introduced in some p-th row where U so that the v-th rows where v U of the conclusion consist of one formula in all. We call by an intuitionistic many-valued logic what is represented by the above-obtained system. If U=T, then the intuitionistic many-valued logic is of course identical with the usual many-valued logic (cf. 3.43) ; if T = {t, f } and U= {f}, then the logic is identical with the intuitionistic logic as is expected (cf. 3.11). Though somewhat artificial, the intuitionistic many-valued logic can also be characterized semantically (cf. Theorem 1). If either U=T or U contains at most one element, then the system enjoys the cut-elimination property (cf. Theorem 4). Moreover, if U contains one and only one element, then the logic enjoys the disjunction property (cf. Theorem 5). On the contrary, if U contains at least two elements (and if sufficiently many connectives are involved), then surprisingly the intuitionistic many-valued logic coincides with the This research was partially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (No. 59340011), Ministry of Education, .
In view of the above facts, the authors propose the intuitionistic manyvalued logics with U containing one and only one element as a candidate for a many-valued analogue of the intuitionistic logic.
In this paper only propositional logics are studied. The intuitionistic manyvalued logics studied in this paper differ from ones studied in Rousseau [2] , each of which is determined by the help of a linear order on the set of truthvalues instead of a subset. § 1. Preliminaries.
1.
1. An intuitionistic many-valued logic is determined by choices of a nonempty finite set T, a set F of functions on T, and a subset U of T. Elements of T are denoted by A, p, v, For p in T, we put ;f = { A A: p } following Takahashi [3] .
1.2. Primitive symbols are countably many propositional variables, a connective Cf (abbreviated by `f') for each f in F, parentheses and a comma.
The connective f is k-ary if f is a k-ary function on T.
1.3. Formulas are defined by the following recursion : a propositional variable standing alone is a formula; if f is a k-ary connective and A1i • • , Ak are formulas, then f (A1, ..•, Ak) is also a formula.
Formulas are denoted by A, B, 1.4. A signed formula is an ordered pair <p, A> of p in T and of a formula A. A matrix is a finite set of signed formulas.
Matrices are denoted by K, L ...
The empty set 0 is also called the empty matrix. For a subset S of T and a formula A, the direct product S x { A } denotes the matrix {<p, A) ( p E S } by one of set-theoretical conventions.
For a matrix K, we put KU= { (p, A) E K I p€ U}.
Expression of a matrix by a set is due to Takahashi [4] .
1.41. KU c K; (KU)U^ KU ; (KU L )U=KU~)LU ; KU LU whenever Kc L. D § 2. A formal system for the intuitionistic many-valued logic.
2.1. A proof-figure is a finite tree of matrices such that every matrix in is either basic, where a matrix K is basic if T X {A} cK for some A, or the conclusion of one of the following inference rules every premise of which is also in ~3.
Cut inference :
for every pl, , p k falsifying (p1, •.. , k)=;a rincipal K '
where <p, f (A1, , Ak)> E K. The pair <p, f (A1, , Ak)> is called the principal signed formula of this inference.
The end-matrix of a proof-figure is the lowest matrix in it. The form of left and right inferences has come from Rousseau [1] .
2.2. A matrix K is provable (H K) if it is the end-matrix of some prooffigure. A matrix K is cut-free provable (H K) if it is the end-matrix of some proof-figure in which the cut inference is not applied.
More precisely, a matrix K is provable with rank n (H n K), where n is a natural number, if it is the end-matrix of some proof-figure which is constructed from n matrices; the notion of K being cut-free provable with rank n (Hn K) is defined similarly.
The notation `H<n K (H< n K, resp.)' is an abbreviation for `IHmK (-gym K, resp.) for some in less than n'.
2.21. Hn K (H K, resp.) whenever Hn K (H K, rasp.) ; Hn L (Hn L, H L or H L, resp.) whenever Hn K (-K, H K or H K, resp.) and Kc L. § 3. A semantical characterization of the intuitionistic many-valued logic.
3.1. A model is a triplet (X, R, v) of a non-empty set X, a reflexive, transitive relation R on X, and a function v which maps each pair of an element of X and of a formula into an element of T, satisfying the following conditions Ml, M2 and M3:
3.11. In this paragraph, we assume that T = {t, f}, F= { n, v, ~, } and U= { f }, where n, V and are binary functions while unary on T defined as follows: [tnv=t if a=t and v=t; pVv=t if either p=t or v=t; pm=t if either p=f or v=t; -ia=t if p=f.
Then the notion of model agrees with that of Kripke model for the intuitionistic logic, so that, in view of Theorem 1 stated in 3.3 below, the intuitionistic many-valued logic coincides with the intuitionistic logic.
3.2. Let (X, R, v) be a model and P X. A matrix K is P-true (P-false, resp.) in (X, R, v) if <v(P, A), A) E K for some A (for no A, resp. ).
3.21. I f PR4 and K is T f alse, then KU is 4-false. PROOF. Suppose that P R4 and KU is 4-true. Then <v(4, A), A) E KU for some A. Hence v(4, A) U, so <v(P, A), A>=<v(4, A), A> E K by Ml, so K is P-true. 0
A matrix is valid if it is T-true in (X, R, v) for every model (X, R, v) and every P in X.
Then the intuitionistic many-valued logic is characterized semantically as follows.
THEOREM 1. A matrix is provable if and only if it is valid.
We shall prove the `only if' part and the `if' part in 3.5 and in 3.6-3.8, respectively.
3.4.
A valuation is a function w which maps each formula into an element of T satisfying w(f (A1, , Ak))= f (w(A1), ••• , w(Ak)) for every k-ary connective f and every formulas A1i ..•, A k. PROOF. To prove the `only if' part, suppose that K is valid and w is a valuation. Since K is 1-true in (X, R, v) , which is the model constructed by the method stated in 3.41, <v(1, A), A> E K and so <w(A), A> E K for some A.
Next, to prove the contraposition of the `if' part, suppose that K is not valid. Then K is 1'-false in (X, R, v) for some model (X, R, v) and some 1' in x. We put w(A)=v(1', A) for every A. Then w forms a valuation and <w(A), A> K for no A. D 3.5. PROOF of the `only if' part of Theorem 1. It suffices to prove that K is valid whenever f-n K, which we shall demonstrate by induction on n.
Suppose that I-n K, (X, R, v) is a model and that T c X. We must show that K is 1'-true. Case 1. K is basic. Then T x { A } _c K for some A. Hence <v(1', A), A> E K, so K is 1'-true.
Case 2. K is the conclusion of the cut inference. Suppose that H<n K v {<p, A)'}, H< n K U {<i, A>} and p ~ v. Suppose, on the contrary to the conclusion, that K is T-false. By the induction hypothesis both Ku {<p, A>} and K U { w, A>} are 1'-true, while either v(1', A) ~ 4a or v(1', A)*, vwhich is a contradiction in either case. So K is 1'-true.
Case 3. K is the conclusion of a left inference. Suppose that H<n KU (pl^x {A1})U...U(pk"X {Ak}) for every ~1i , 1k falsifying f(p1, ..., ~k)= fJ, and that p U and <p, f (A1, ..•, A k)> E K. Suppose, on the contrary to the conclusion, that K is T-false. Then v(1', f (A1, A k)) /=p, so f (v(F, A1), v(1', Ak)) ~ p by M2. Putting a =v(T, A;) for j=1, k, we obtain f (p i , pk) /= , so KU(p1 x {A1})U•••U(pk~x {Ak}) is 1'-true by the induction hypothesis, which is a contradiction. Hence K is T-true.
Case 4. K is the conclusion of a right inference. Suppose that H<n K°U (p' x {A1})U...U(pk^ x {Ak}) for every Pi, ... , pk falsifying f (p1, ..., Irk) =~a and that p U and <p, f (A1, ..•, Ak)) E K. Suppose, on the contrary to the conclusion, that K is T-false. Then v(T, f (A1, Ak)) ~ p, so f (v(4, A1), v(4, Ak))~ a for some 4 such that FR4 by M3. Putting ,u;=v(4, A;) for j = 1,..., k, we obtain f (p , ... pk)~4a, so K°u(~i1 x {A1})U...U(pk"x {Ak}) is 4-true by the induction hypothesis, which contradicts 3.21. Hence K is F-true. D 3.6. We shall devote the rest of this section to the proof of the `if' part of Theorem 1.
A generalized matrix (abbreviated by `g-matrix') is a finite or infinite set of signed formulas. A g-matrix is provable if it contains a provable matrix. A g-matrix is maximal unprovable if it is unprovable and any proper extension of it is provable.
3.61. Any matrix is a g-matrix. A matrix is provable i ff it is provable as a g-matrix. D 3.62. Any unprovable g-matrix can be extended to a maximal unprovable one. PROOF. Suppose that 11 is an unprovable g-matrix, and let C,uo, Av>, C,u1, Al>, CP2, A2>, • • • be an enumeration of all the signed formulas. We define the gmatrix II n by the following recursion : 11o=11; Hn+1=11 n or =11,u An>} according as HnU { C pn, A>} is provable or not. Then the g-matrix UT°°o 11 n is the required one. 0 3.63. I f 1' is a maximal unprovable g-matrix, then for every A there exists one and only one p falsifying CSC, A> E r. PROOF. If T x {A} ~ F, then F is provable, which is a contradiction. Hence CSC, A> F for some p. Next, suppose that <n1, A> F, Cpl, A> F and ~1 ~ p2. Then both Eu {<p, A>} and r U { C,u2, A> } are provable since they are proper extensions of F. So in view of the cut inference, F is provable, which is a contradiction, too. Hence there is one and only one p falsifying Cp, A> ET. To prove the contraposition, suppose that K is unprovable. Then K is extended to a maximal unprovable g-matrix 1'. We claim that K is 1'-false in the model (X, R, v) introduced above. Suppose, on the contrary to the conclusion, that K is T-true. Then <v(T', A), A> E K for some A. So <v(P, A), A> E 1', which is a contradiction. Hence K is I'-false, so it is not valid. D § 4. Syntactical properties of the formal system. 4.1. In this paragraph we wish to display the choice of U, so we denote H K and H n K by H U K and H n K, respectively. 4.11. Suppose U V c T . Then KU c KY ; IH n K (H" K, resp.) whenever H n K (H U K, res p. ). D 4.12. According to Theorem 3 below and to 3.43, if Card(U)>_2, where Card(U) denotes the cardinality of U, then the intuitionistic many-valued logic has no sense as an intuitionistic one. First we remark the fact that for every matrix L and every formula B, (2) if Hn1 Ku {<2, A>}, Ku {<22, A>} and 21*/t2, then H K.
We shall prove (2) by induction on w • d (A) + n 1 + n 2, where d (A) denotes the number of occurrences of connectives in A.
First, we remark the fact that for every matrix L and every formula B, Since S=p# for some p in T, by the assumption H LUIS x { B} ). Case 3. Otherwise.
Take 21 and 22 such that 21, 22E T-S and 21 * 22, then by the hypothesis of induction on Card(T--S) we have H L U(S x { B } )U { <21, B>} and H L U(S x { B } )U { <22, B>}, so by the hypothesis of induction on w • d(A)+ n1+n2 we obtain H LUIS x { B } ). This completes the proof of (3) . Now, to prove (2) suppose that Hnl KU{<21, A>}, Hn2 KU{<22, A>} and 21 *22. We put Kti =K `J { <2i, A>} for i=1, 2.
For the cut-free provable matrix K1 (i=1, 2), one of the following five cases occurs :
I. Ki is basic. ii. Kz is the conclusion of a left inference, and the principal signed formula belongs to K.
III. Ki is the conclusion of a right inference, and the principal signed formula belongs to K. N. Ki is the conclusion of a left inference, and the principal signed formula is <2i, A>.
V. Kti is the conclusion of a right inference, and the principal signed formula is <2i, A>.
Remark that neither the case III nor the case V occurs when U=T. We shall show H K by cases. Case 1. Either K1 or K2 is of case I. We suppose, without loss of generality, that K1 is the case. Then T x { B } c K1 for some B. If B is distinct from A, then T x { B } c_ K, so K is basic, so H K; if B is identical with A, then <22, A>EK, so K2-K, so F-* K. Case 2. Either K1 or K2 is of case II. We suppose that K1 is the case. Suppose that H~~1 K1u(v1.' x {B1})U•••U(vh"x {Bh}) for every vl, , vh falsifying g(v1,
, vh)=v, and that v E U and <v, g(B1i , B h)> E K. If g(v1, , vh) ~ v, then
